Exploiting an exogenous change in the reporting threshold of Brazil’s public credit registry we show an increase in borrowing for newly included risky and lower interest rates for safer firms. The additional lending comes primarily from new private bank-firm relationships, whereas the reduction in interest rates is driven by incumbent lenders. While collateralization decreases, incumbent lenders shorten loan maturities, pointing to important changes in loan contract design. Risky borrowers show a decline (increase) in loan default with incumbent (new) lenders. The policy change translates into higher employment. Our results are consistent with disciplining and competition hypotheses of information sharing and highlight important heterogeneities across firms’ risk profiles and lender types.
Comissão Organizadora
Anderson Odias da Silva
Claudia Yoshinaga
Ricardo D. Brito
Felipe Saraiva Iachan
Vinicius Augusto Brunassi Silva
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