I study asset pricing when re-trade can take place in co-existing and interconnected markets. In my framework, there is a divisible asset and a finite set of traders. They are distributed over a trading network. Traders can acquire shares at a common price, and then they may trade with their connections at possibly different prices. I find that trading centrality, a novel network metric, is a sufficient statistic for the equilibrium. Trading centrality processes information about expected re-trade equilibria, and maps it to traders’ behavior before trade. A trader’s asset acquisition is proportional to his centrality, and the asset common price is defined by aggregating centrality globally. For the re-trades in the network, a trader demands the gap between his optimal level of asset and his centrality; while each price is defined by aggregating centrality locally in the seller’s network. I investigate what market outcomes and welfare arise at different trading networks. Implications for asset issuance and interdealer markets are examined.
Comissão Organizadora
Anderson Odias da Silva
Claudia Yoshinaga
Ricardo D. Brito
Felipe Saraiva Iachan
Vinicius Augusto Brunassi Silva