Evasive Shareholder Meetings, Meeting Announcement Lag, and Stock Price Crash Risk

  • Author
  • Lucas Allan Diniz Schwarz
  • Co-authors
  • Nayana Reiter , Flávia Zóboli Dalmácio
  • Abstract
  • We examine the relationship between evasive shareholder meetings practices and stock price crash risk. Using hand-collected data on annual shareholder meeting scheduling’ characteristics for 9,086 meetings held by 1,486 public U.S. firms between 2012 and 2020, we find only weak evidence that firms holding annual general meetings in or near headquarters exhibit lower future stock price crash risk, and this weak effect disappears after controlling for firm fixed effects, in specific subsamples or after taking potential self-selection bias into account. On the other hand, we initially find a puzzling strong negative relationship between evasive timing strategies and stock price crash risk. However, after controlling for firm fixed effects, this effect virtually disappears. We also find no evidence that firms are strategically announcing meetings closer to annual meeting dates to withhold bad news from investors. Collectively, we find no evidence that evasive shareholder meetings practices (distance-based or timing-based) affect future stock price crash risk.

  • Keywords
  • Evasive shareholder meetings, Crash Risk, Annual meetings
  • Subject Area
  • Corporate Finance, Intermediation, and Banking
Back Download
  • Asset pricing, investments, and Derivatives
  • Corporate Finance, Intermediation, and Banking
  • Econometrics and Numerical Methods

Comissão Organizadora

Anderson Odias da Silva
Claudia Yoshinaga
Ricardo D. Brito
Felipe Saraiva Iachan
Vinicius Augusto Brunassi Silva